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Introduction. Time preferences have always been 
in the center of the economists’ concerns. 
This crucial priority lies in a fact that the idea of 
time preferences influences not only individuals’ well-
being, but also a national welfare. It can be one of the 
explanatory factors of low savings, indexes of health be-
havior and so on. The concept of time preferences in-
duces the person to choose between costs and benefits 
at different moments in time. Each decision entails a se-
ries of consequences and additional costs.  
How people are able to establish priorities or be in-
clined to resist different kinds of temptations will be re-
flected in their consumption at the current moment and 
will have an impact on a future consumption plan, espe-
cially in the period after retirement combined with a 
lower income and sensitivity to savings. Every day we 
face different situations, which force us to make a 
choice: buy shoes right now, leave it for later, spend 
money now or deposit in a bank to earn an interest rate, 
quit smoking and enjoy it in presence or start thinking 
about destructive impact of smoking on our health. All 
this list can be continued for long, situations can be dif-
ferent, the only thing in common is the necessity of self-
control. There are different constraints which prevent 
people from committing wrong choice or from procras-
tination of making any choice, such as loans, deadlines 
or simply our inner self-control, which depends on many 
different subjective factors. The classical economic 
model does not take into consideration psychological 
and cultural peculiarities, which have a large impact on 
the process of decision-making. The absence of these 
variable leads to misleading results on practice. Even the 
mood the agent can cause severe deviations in under-
standing the economic behavior.  
In this paper the model with an adjustment for cul-
tural and psychological is introduced. The differences 
between cultural dimensions and belonging to the group 
of risk averse individuals and their impact on the setting 
discount rate are illustrated in a light of this research. 
Despite the comparative analysis of exponential and hy-
perbolic discount models, the important drawbacks of 
the most widespread discount model are determined and 
several anomalies are discussed. The survey is focused 
on formalization of time-inconsistent preferences and 
tendency to procrastinate depending on the structure of 
costs.  
We start from a consideration of a theoretical back-
ground of utility model beginning with a classical model 
and ending with quasi-hyperbolic discount model which 
combines the features of prior concepts. Also measures 
against procrastination and different temptations, named 
as commitment devices, are put forward. The disparity 
in individuals’ behavior is explored from the perspective 
of awareness of self-control problems by the division of 
consumers to naïve and sophisticated.  
Then we analyze why people differ substantially in 
consumption plans and levels of savings; different me- 
thods are reviewed. The long-term discount rate and the 
short-term discount rate are compared between each 
other. We use such instruments as violin plots, regres-
sion model and decision trees.  
Finally, we describe obtained data through the 
questionnaire and the results revealed by means of  
analysis tools. The core of the work lies in the establish-
ment of the relationship between country variable, 
which contains the information on cultural peculiarities, 
national welfare and the level of consumption, risk aver-
sion variable, implying that individual tends to skip any 
risk by sticking with already existent prospect and the 
subjective discount rate. Then the discussion on the re-
sults is conducted, explanations in favor of the extended 
with psychological forces are outlined and shortcomings 
of the model and their solutions in order to reduce their 
effect on occurred bias are described. 
Some words about classical model of inter-
temporal choice. Some people tend to consume more 
today and suffer from a lack of savings in future. The 
allocation of income between the current consumption 
and the future one underlies the concept of intertemporal 
analysis. 
The first author, who contributed to the inter-
temporal analysis, was Fisher (1930) by proposing in- 
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different curves, which are used for representing how 
the rational individual will distribute the consumption 
between the past and the future. The main assumptions 
for this model are the absence of uncertainty, conside- 
ration of the two periods and the perfect capital market. 
Each curve supposes two goods and illustrates such 
combination of present and future consumption that 
generate the same satisfaction and how the former one 
can be transformed into the next one by making invest-
ments in the real capital projects. The utility is being 
maximized by moving to the higher indifferent curve. 
According to the shape of these curves, we are able to 
identify whether the patient consumer was being exa- 
mined or an impatient one. The patient consumer tends 
to save more and in case of the increase in the current 
consumption he tries to decrease a future consumption 
by relatively same amount of units in order to save the 
equal indifferent curve. In light of the patient consumer 
indifferent curve has a gradual slope, whereas consider-
ing the impatient consumer, who in contrast is more 
likely to spend more right now instead of leaving it for 
later, we will have a steep slope of the indifference 
curve. Hence, the shape of the Fisher’s indifference 
curves is crucial in terms of saving and borrowing deci-
sions and depends on the individuals’ time preferences 
and the diminishing marginal utility. The concept of in-
difference curves has become the main basis for the de-
velopment of the discounted utility model. Fisher (1930) 
considered different determinants of the time prefe- 
rences and formulated them as a combination of objec-
tive and personal drivers. The list of personal factors is 
composed of «foresight», which depicts how well the 
individual is able to foresee future and «fashion» that 
has impact both on the interest rate and on the distribu-
tion of wealth itself. 
Later Paul Samuelson introduced a discounting 
model for Fisher’s indifference curves analysis imply-
ing a multiple amount of the time periods as a two- 
period Fisher’s model might be inappropriate on prac-
tice for some situations (Samuelson, 1937).  
In the classical economic theory, the exponential 
utility model is a standard framework for examining in-
tertemporal decisions. However, due to the large amount 
of the empirical researches, comprising of the questions 
about some hypothetical situations and subsequent indi-
viduals’ decisions, the validity of this concept is in ques-
tion. The issue about exponential utility model is that 
discount rate is unified and constant for any economical 
agent and does not take into consideration any external 
factors or psychological motives, which can influence 
individuals during a process of decision-making. 
In order to understand the concept of the exponen-
tial utility I need to represent the list of the important 
assumptions, which underpin this model. 
First of all, people’s time preferences are positive, 
which means that people prefer to receive goods as soon 
as possible and the subjective discount rate takes values 
less than 1. 
Secondly, preferences are considered to be time-
consistent, which implies the constant discount rate as it 
was already mentioned above. The ratio of the discount 
function in any period to the prior period is equal to the 
discount factor. 
Thirdly, the utility in any period does not depend 
on the utility in any other period. The same thing can be 
said in terms of the consumption independence.  
Additionally, the utility function is stationary and 
continuous, which indicates that individuals do not 
change their preferences over time. 
However, all the theoretical assumptions which un-
derlie the exponential utility model couldn’t find a wide 
application in practice and also exponential model used 
to face different kinds of anomalies which will be dis-
cussed later during this work. Considering the field of 
the intertemporal choice and discounted utility model it 
is crucial to mention the key axiom about how indivi- 
duals evaluate their consumption plan. This axiom pre-
sumes that integrating new alternatives to the already 
existing plan can be accomplished only by regarding ac-
cumulated consumption in the previous periods and the 
influence of the new alternative on the consumption in 
the future periods. Despite the fact that in theory these 
assumptions seem to be normatively compelling it is 
hardly can be found in the real life. Usually people are 
not fully aware of their future plans or they can evaluate 
their optimal plan by being too self-confident or being 
conscious about chance to fail (optimism and pessimism 
cognitive biases). Evidently, classical model ignores the 
problem of uncertainty stressed by Heteredox Econo- 
mics, especially by Post Keynesian approach (Da-
vidson, 1972; Carvalho, 1992). 
The desire to go to the Italian or Vietnamese res-
taurant is undoubtedly influenced by the previous expe-
rience, which challenges the question about consump-
tion independence.  
Also exponential model was unable to explain why 
gain are discounted according to the higher subjective 
discount rate than losses are.  
The crucial point in studying exponential dis-
counted utility model lies in the time-inconsistency, 
which wasn’t taken into consideration, but was often ob-
served during lots of empirical researches. The idea of 
time-consistent preferences defines that if person pre-
fers 1000 dollars now over 1500 dollars in one week, he 
will still have same preferences if will be asked about 
one year and one year and half. Hence time preferences 
remain constant whereas time horizon becomes wider. 
Let assume that we have an individual that has 
three years till retirement left and he is about to distri- 
bute his income and expenses in the most sufficient way. 
Time-inconsistent preferences imply that when we ob-
serve high discount rate between utility in the period t 
and utility in the period t+1 and relatively low rate be-
tween t+1 and t+2 whereas when the period t+1 actually 
comes, discount rate between t+1 and t+2 is way higher 
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than it was initially expected so the individual will carry 
out the different consumption plan. Time consistent 
preferences suppose that optimal consumer plan re-
mains the same through time.  
However, in practice it can be easily demonstrated 
that time preferences are influenced by many different 
factors both objective and personal, which make them 
unstable over a time period. 
Some researchers argue that time-inconsistent 
preferences are often hard to be evaluated as the person 
changes his attitude at different times. This problem 
eliminated in some papers (Goldman, 1979; Laibson, 
1996; 1997) by using Pareto criteria, which states that 
one alternative prevails over another one, when the per-
son considers this alternative the most attractive among 
the whole range of perspectives. However, Pareto crite-
ria turns out to be too weak for any assumptions when 
one outcome certainly generates a greater utility than an-
other one. 
All the points mentioned during this chapter lead to 
the necessity of the utility model to be further expanded 
by including the careful analyses of all gaps and anom-
alies occurred in practice and the emergence of such 
modifications as «hyperbolic» and «quasi-hyperbolic» 
discounting. 
Some words about hyperbolic discounting. The 
concept of the constant rate failed on practice as a wide 
range of laboratory studies revealed that discount rates 
in the short-run use to predominate over the discount 
rates in the long-run. This discrepancy is hold in the hy-
perbolic discount function, which implies a diminishing 
discount rate.  
Every individual faces the daily situation whether 
to consume the good now or save it for later. The hyper-
bolic discounting model gives an explanation for the 
question why do people tend to overweight present to 
future, why do they are most likely to have the low level 
of savings after the retirement and why do they tend to 
frequently borrow in the credit market. When people are 
about to plan their future consumption they are willing 
to meet deadlines, give up on bad habits and start saving 
in advance in order not to suffer from the lack of money 
after the retirement. When the moment of the retirement 
actually comes, our real income is lower than we ex-
pected. This gap between long-run intentions and real 
short-run actions shows the contradiction between peo-
ples’ short-term preferences and long-term desires.  
In the economic literature the first one who made 
researches in the field of time-inconsistent individuals 
was Strotz (1955). He proposed two strategies that 
might be employed by a person who foresees how her 
preferences will change over time: the “strategy of pre-
commitment” (wherein she commits to some plan of ac-
tion) and the “strategy of consistent planning.” (wherein 
she chooses her behavior ignoring plans that she knows 
her future selves will not carry out) (Frederick et al, 
2002). 
The thing is that hyperbolic discounting is taken 
into consideration mostly in terms of explanation of 
time-inconsistency. However, hyperbolic discounting 
appears to be valid enough merely when not only time-
consistency is violated, but also stationarity is not hold. 
Violations of both assumptions cause certain choice re-
versals, which can be explained by the concept of hy-
perbolic discounting, but again, only in case when they 
both are not adhered. Time-inconsistency occurs when 
the person is asked in a zero period whether to get 100$ 
in a month or 110$ in two months and he is willing to 
wait for a higher reward one extra month. When it gets 
closer to the end of the first month, he exhibits the 
choice reversal, which means that he is becoming less 
patient and more excited about a sooner, but smaller re-
ward rather than a larger gratification that implies addi-
tional month of waiting. In general terms the concept of 
time-inconsistent preferences describes the contradic-
tion in preferences between long-term plans and short-
term decisions. Being asked far in advance the individ-
ual is ready to act relatively patient whereas the closer 
he gets to the lower reward the more he is willing to opt 
for it instead of choosing the more beneficial alternative.  
The individual violates the term of stationarity if he 
prefers 100$ tomorrow to 110$ in a month, but rather 
have 110$ in two months than 100$ in a month. When 
we analyze the violation of stationarity, the time period 
doesn’t change like it does in a light of time-incon-
sistency. Individual is being asked in a zero period about 
two possible outcomes, which can be obtained in diffe- 
rent time periods, the similarity is that the time dif- 
ference between two offered prospects is the same 
whenever he is proposed to get them. In the example 
above the time-difference between 100 and 110$ is one 
month and according to stationarity axiom individual is 
obliged to choose the same reward no matter which time 
frames are stated. There is one more explanation for 
choice reversals, which is called time invariance 
(Halevy, 2015). It refers to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion, meaning that 100$ today is equal to 110$ in any 
moment asked. However, this kind of difference in a 
consumption can be estimated due to some changes in 
economic wealth, which do not depend on consumers’ 
decisions. If time invariance is not satisfied, it could be 
a mistake to identify hyperbolic discounting. Unfortu-
nately, designing experiments that will observe time in-
variance requires large costs and long process during 
which the experimental methodology loses its power. 
So, Krupka and Stephens (2013) analyzed time-variance 
and received outcomes that presumed time instability to 
be not a random variable, considering different eco-
nomic factors.  
Janssens et al (2017) designed an important expe- 
riment, through which they examined the effects of vio- 
lations of all three assumptions in order to make conclu-
sions about low savings. They claim that in some cases 
violations of time invariance emerge due to the liquidity 
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constraints so that consumers have less access to infor-
mal credit and tend to lose more wealth over time. That 
is why, not only hyperbolic discounting should be meas-
ured as a driver for choice reversals, but also liquidity 
constraints should be analyzed. In order to examine the 
influence of liquidity constraints they conducted an ex-
periment among the participants, who suffer from a lack 
access to credit and savings and possess highly volatile 
income (Janssens et al, 2017). These findings represent 
a strong importance for design of commitment saving 
devices. Also for the targeted group of participants, who 
operate under the imperfect financial market, the liqui- 
dity constraints imposed by the government policy 
might be too strong and harmful.  
Under the concept of the hyperbolic discounting 
two types of consumers are highlighted: naive and so-
phisticated. The way how the individuals are going to 
behave depends on the degree how they are aware of 
their time-inconsistency. Naive consumers do not rec-
ognize the issue of the time-inconsistency so they do not 
foresee that their future selves will differ from the cur-
rent ones and strongly believe that their initial plan will 
be carried out in the future. Sophisticated consumers, in 
contrast, do realize that this problem exists and use a 
commitment as a tool how to fight with their self-control 
issues. Commitment is a promise made by individuals in 
order to follow their current plans in future. There are 
different examples of the commitments, such as dead-
lines, which drive people to finish work on time, loans 
that play role of a special constraint on the overcon-
sumption as the individual becomes limited in their 
spending and even marriages can be viewed as a com-
mitment tool because it restricts persons when it comes 
to different kind of temptations or hot states. Focus on 
self-control problems also takes place when it comes to 
information-acquisition decisions. Standard economic 
models accept that priority be given to acquiring any 
free information as it results in more profitable deci-
sions. You can ask for advice of your friend when it 
comes to the decision about potential investments or 
take your time, processing information and examining 
investment strategies. Self-control problems can lead to 
ignorance of information due to the increased likelihood 
of a possible misbehavior as a consequence. Nowadays, 
in terms of the information abundance the chance of bias 
caused by obtaining not valid information leading to a 
future misbehavior is extremely high, which implies the 
necessity of careful, selective information gathering. 
In terms of the sophisticated consumers further is-
sues such as impatience or procrastination can be accu-
rately considered. If both outcomes are viewed from the 
long-term perspective, individuals are able to act rela-
tively patient. Far in advance they are ready to wait for 
a more beneficial alternative, however, when the mo- 
ment actually comes, people fail to wait one extra day 
so they prefer an immediate gratification. For example, 
assume that you can have a thirty-minute break in 102 
days or go for a twenty-minute break in 101 days. If you 
consider both opportunities today, the chance of having 
a longer break and one day of waiting sound way more 
reasonable. But when the date of the twenty-minute 
break comes the preferences face a reverse, which is 
called “magnet effect”, and bring out the impatience to 
prefer an immediate reward instead of waiting. Also 
there is a term or partial naivety formulated by O’Do-
noghue and Rabin (2003), when the person is aware of 
the time-inconsistent preferences, but underestimate 
their influence. This approach sounds way more realistic 
among the other, whereas the standard economical 
model assumes that consumers are fully sophisticated 
and able to foresee their behavior. 
Procrastination. An often used implication of 
time-inconsistent preferences is procrastination. All 
people use to procrastinate during their life period. 
Some of them leave their unpleasant duties for later 
quite regular and some of them try to solve this problem 
using some commitment devices such as deadlines. Pro-
crastination is based on two important questions – which 
task to perform and when. When we are about to start 
the project we consider long-term benefits, whereas our 
decision to put off something is based on the immediate 
effort. 
Procrastination does not necessary mean that  
people spend lots of time to persuade themselves to ac-
tually start doing the task. Procrastination can also occur 
during the mid-term stages, when, for example, the per-
son has started the project, but was not willing to finish 
some mid-term tasks, so he procrastinated the end of the 
plan. It often happens, when the beginning does not de-
mand many efforts and the vast amount of efforts should 
be implemented in the middle of the project or in the 
end. Hence, the type of procrastination strongly depends 
on the cost structure. Also according to the intuition of 
economic researchers O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003), 
who have conducted various experiments in a field of 
the behavioral economics and procrastination, in parti- 
cular, the expansion of the proposed alternatives can 
cause procrastination more probably. This can be ex-
plained by the evidence, that new options can be poten-
tially more beneficial for the individual, but include 
higher costs, which will result in a systematic delay 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003). 
How it was already mentioned before, consumers 
can be divided in several categories depending on the 
degree of their understanding about time-inconsistent 
preferences. Awareness about time-inconsistent prefe- 
rences and self-controls problem is extremely signifi-
cant in terms of procrastination due to the natural appli-
cation of procrastination for self-control problems.  
Naive consumers formulate their future plans and the 
way how they are going to accomplish their perfor- 
mance target and when the period of carrying out their 
plans arrive, their preferences face the reversal and they 
fail to meet their initial assumptions and hopes and end 
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up not completing the long-term task at all. Each type of 
procrastination implies inevitable losses or foregone op- 
portunities. If the person has started the project, but 
wasn’t able to finish it, he didn’t only lose the potential 
benefits which could possibly arise by the end of his 
work, but also wasted his effort on the stage of the be-
ginning. In contrast, sophisticated consumers are aware 
of the self-control problems and they are presumed to 
foresee their future behavior more accurately. It is clear 
that naive consumers are more likely to procrastinate 
than sophisticated consumers. However, the degree of 
the awareness is often hard to be measured, so anyone 
can be potentially vulnerable to procrastination. Also 
the definition of partial naivety exists as a separate ca- 
tegory which demonstrate the type of consumers, who 
understand the core of time-inconsistency problem, but 
use to underestimate its magnitude. The concept of pro-
crastination is under attention in terms of the hyperbolic 
discounting as the desire to put off is connected with im-
mediate costs, contradicting their long-term plans, 
which is similar to the desire to get a sooner gratification 
rather than waiting for a more pleasant alternative. 
Needless to say, that procrastination takes place only 
when the project is worth of starting. Otherwise, pro-
crastination is not meant to arise. O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (2002) examined the question of procrastination 
with exogenous costs by applying a two-parameter 
model originally developed by Phelps and Pollak 
(1968), which has the following look: 
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This model consists of two important variables, 
such as b, which represents standard “time-consistent” 
impatience, whereas the parameter beta illustrates a 
time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratifica-
tion. For beta equal to 1, these preferences are time-con-
sistent. But for beta less than 1, at any given moment the 
person has an extra bias for preferring now over the fu-
ture. Beta is basically an error which describes «self-
control» issues due to the contradictions it causes, ex-
pressed as a prevalence of the current well-being over 
the future one at any period of time (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 2002). More and more economists have been in-
cluding lately the psychological factor of self-control 
problems in their analyses in order to compute the dis-
count function for intertemporal choice. Needless to say, 
that self-awareness doesn’t matter and doesn’t presume 
to be relevant in terms of the sequences of outcomes or 
long-term commitments. Sequence of outcomes implies 
that person doesn’t need to choose, whether to have a 
dessert today night or not, but commits to the series of 
deserts, which can be consumed or not during next three 
months, which implies long-term decisions. Under these 
circumstances, barely could the person accomplish the 
most appropriate for him choice so the role awareness is 
not valid enough. Also if the consequences of one deci-
sion do not have an impact on other decision’s payoff, 
those two are considered to be disconnected, which 
again decrease the influence of self-awareness on deci- 
sion-making process. Self-control problem reflects an 
important magnitude on people’s behavior as it leads to 
people not behaving in their own interests and, as a re-
sult, harming themselves. In some cases, the size of the 
harm is not large, but systematical harm emerged during 
the range of decisions possesses a danger for people. 
On the other side, if two decisions are connected, 
the shift in behavior can be explained by self-control 
problems. The following research was established in 
terms of two-stages projects in O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(2002) paper, but can also be applied for multiple period 
works. On every step the individual faces a choice to ac-
complish the task or not without any commitment de-
vices available. The chance that self-control problems 
occurs depends on a fact, if the task suggested is labo- 
rious or a pleasant one. The main requirement is that 
person possesses certain believes about his behavior and 
that he chooses his actions according to the principles of 
maximization his utilities and preferences. Immediately 
the cognitive bias can be considered in a light of this as-
sumption due to the inability of the individual to carry 
out the strategy, which will satisfy his needs or to ana-
lyze which kind of decisions will maximize his well- 
being. The terms procrastination is used when it is the 
matter of putting off the tasks repeatedly based on a will-
ingness to work in the near future, but then changing 
one’s mind when that near-future date arrives.  
From the first sight it may sound that fully sophis-
ticated person is not prone to procrastinate according to 
this definition of procrastination. However, he tends to 
delay as well if the immediate gratification is stronger 
than the cost structure. Hence, procrastination plays a 
vital regarding consumers’ level of being sophisticated 
as it appeared to be a sphere, where sophistication might 
be a misleading factor. Taking all the points above into 
consideration, it is clearly assumed that person is more 
likely to procrastinate on the stage, which contains the 
highest cost comparing to the other phases of the project. 
Moreover, naives tend to procrastinate way more, than 
sophisticated consumers do as they strongly believe that 
they will perform the task in the next period despite the 
occurred delay. Unlike the naives, sophisticated agents 
are more willing to carry out the plan on the first stage 
due to their awareness that in case of the delay they are 
going to procrastinate the performance for long period 
of time. It means, that if they decide to procrastinate 
some task, they are okay with this delay and they have 
already set up the moment when the task will be actually 
completed. Many papers include the deadlines as the 
most important commitment tool, which is used by con-
sumers in order to prevent themselves from the procras- 
tination. One study – by Ariely and Wertenbroch 
(2002) – proved that people with exogenously imposed 
deadlines were more likely to perform the project in a 
sufficient way than the group of people who were pro- 
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posed to establish deadlines on their own and ended up 
having a longer delay and less successful grades.  
All the discussion above was mainly hold in case 
of the onerous opportunities, which can cause procrasti-
nation to a larger extent. However, another research con-
ducted by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) assumes that 
providing individuals with more extra opportunities, 
which sometimes bring even more pleasure and increase 
their well-being, can lead to procrastination as well and 
procrastination important goals is more serious than pro-
crastination unimportant goals. This can be explained by 
the following conclusion: «If a new option has a suffi-
ciently high long-run net benefit, the person will plan to 
do this new option rather than what she would have  
otherwise done; and if this new option has a sufficiently 
large cost relative to its immediate benefit, the person 
now procrastinates» (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). 
The second anomaly that people tend to procrasti-
nate more often important tasks rather than unimportant 
or increasing importance of tasks induces the chance of 
the emergence of procrastination can be illustrated by a 
simple example based on a person’s saving plan. Let us 
suppose that the person is determined to save 10,000 
euro for retirement 35 years from now. He is earning 
right now 1% interest rate in his account, but he can  
easily make a transfer and start getting 5% interest rate 
instead of the current one. This alternative doesn’t imply 
high costs, can be performed without much effort and is 
worth of considering. However, the decision about the 
retirement plan in undoubtedly crucial for many people, 
which can result in a possibility that the person will 
spend many years looking for any rate, higher than 5% 
and meanwhile will procrastinate and lose money in ex-
change for investing in a potentially profitable plan – 
5% rate. 
This sub-topic can find a significant practical ap-
plicability as it allows to schedule the working process 
in the most sufficient way so any employee will be ca-
pable of accomplishments the parts of the project despite 
the variations in they disabilities.  
The Reference-Point Model. Hyperbolic dis-
counting is not capable of explaining, why gains are dis-
counted with a higher weight than losses are. The main 
contribution to this anomaly was made by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) in their paper dedicated to the vio-
lations of general axioms of expected utility model, who 
interpreted the overweight values of gains comparing to 
losses under the concept of risk aversion and developed 
a prospect theory model. This model evaluates the cer-
tainty effect assuming that people tend to assign a 
greater weight to alternatives, which can happen with a 
certain guarantee, comparing to less possible one, and 
explains the concavity of utility function. The person is 
considered to be risk averse, if he prefers to stick to al- 
ready existing prospect rather than shift to a risky one. 
If we consider so-called positive domain implying cer-
tain gains and slightly possible larger gains, individual 
opts for a former one, which reveals risk averse. There-
fore, same effect occurs in a negative domain, when 
seeking for a less probable loss over a certain smaller 
loss reflects risk seeking. Also, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) emphasize, that during decision-making people 
disregard a wide range of components, which means that 
different decompositions lead to different preferences. 
This anomaly is called the isolation effect. What is more 
is that people use to evaluate opportunities from a per-
spective of the final stage. They do not view the pro-
spects as a sequence. Two risky outcomes can be re-
garded in a standard form whereas the choice between 
the investment in the risky venture with a particular 
probability of losing capital if it fails or getting some 
percentage in case of success and fixed return rate seems 
more complicated to be measured. If we look at these 
alternatives on the basis of isolations effect, the certain 
reward obtained by investing in a secure venture, for  
example government bonds, appears to be more attrac-
tive. However, the results obtained during this pattern 
can be ambiguous and lead to the contradiction with a 
standard expected utility model. Usually the decision 
tree is used as tool to view the outcomes as a sequence 
and compare risky and riskless prospects. The prospect 
theory entails two stages in the choice prospect: the  
editing phase illustrates the basic analysis of the offered 
opportunities and the second stage implies the estima-
tion of prospects and choice of the prospect with the 
higher value. The changes in values should not be re-
viewed just from the preliminary point, both the position 
that serves as reference point, and the effect of the 
change (positive or negative) from that reference point 
have to be considered.  
How it was mentioned earlier, the decision is influ-
enced by the people’s awareness of their inconsistent 
preferences. However, at the moment, when they are not 
capable of identifying the violations their preferences 
bring, the prospect theory could be a useful tool in mea- 
suring those anomalies. This concept possesses a poten-
tial significance due to considering the way how the pro-
spects are recognized and how gains, losses and am- 
biguous outcomes are evaluated under the risk.  
On the basis of the prospect theory the Reference-
Point Model as a modification of the hyperbolic model 
was introduced. This model is considered to be crucial 
in terms of people’s attitudes towards risk and explana-
tion why people use to discount losses less intensively 
than gains. The theory of reference point formation was 
proposed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), who in-
cluded a psychological factor of gain-loss utility and ar-
gued that preferences are reference-dependent and re- 
ference point is based on the people's rational anticipa- 
tions about their behavior. They decomposed the model 
proving that estimation the probability weights influ- 
ence the psychological part, but does not have any im-
pact on a consumption utility as it represents a «ra-
tional» component of the model. Also the possibility of 
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including the prospect with an outcome zero as a mini-
mum one into the mix of different prospects was exa- 
mined. Whereas the standard models are based on sum-
marizing all data or individual estimation, the Refe- 
rence-Point Model looks for a balance between both of 
methods in order to obtain more explicit parameter esti-
mates by means of Bayesian analysis.  
The model of habit formation. The model of habit 
formation plays a vital role to the surveys about consum-
ers' utility as it explores the responses of real spending 
to various shocks. The idea is that consumers’ utility 
partly depends on current consumption relative to past 
consumption  
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In this formula current utility U depends on the 
consumption in a current period relative to lagged con-
sumption. The parameter y depicts the importance of the 
reference level relative to current consumption. 
In terms of habit formation this formula can be rewritten 
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Habit-forming consumers are willing to smooth 
both the level and the change in consumption as they do 
not like large decreases in their consumption. Habit for-
mation model explains a hump-shaped response by the 
gradual response of the level and change in the con-
sumption to changes in interest rates or income.  
That is why, when these consumers agree to hold a risky 
asset, which threaten the stability of their income, they 
ask for a higher risk premium. This model also reveals 
the important dynamic correlations between consump-
tion, output, interest rate and inflation, which were not 
considered in standard models earlier. The findings ac-
quired by using this model fit the real data in a more 
sufficient manner due to the implementation of the con-
sumer's incentive to smooth the change and the level of 
consumption to income shocks and gradual decline in 
inflation during a disinflation. The main conclusion is 
that after some financial shocks consumption faces the 
sluggish adjustment only in the short-term. 
 
Quasi-hyperbolic formulation. Despite the fact 
that hyperbolic discounting is subject to be a large step 
in a field of time preferences as it managed to fit a large 
sample of real data, this concept failed to predict such 
anomalies as a “sign effect” which implies that people 
discount gains with a higher value than losses, “magni-
tude effect’ focusing of higher discount rates for a larger 
reward in contrast to a relatively small. These and other 
variations were not reflected in a hyperbolic discounting 
but they triggered another explanatory model called 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The core is that this mo- 
dels still appeals to the same premises as hyperbolic did 
about individuals’ impatience about immediate trade-
offs but for the rest of the period hold the discount rate 
constant. It still shows that individual acts impatiently in 
terms of today and tomorrow, exhibiting low discount 
rates as it was stated in hyperbolic discounting, whereas 
the discount rates from tomorrow onwards remain con-
stant by analogy with exponential discounting model. 
Therefore, the discount rate is not increasing over time. 
Basically quasi-hyperbolic discounting represents the 
combination of both discounting models discussed  
earlier. Its advantage compared to other lies in a distinc-
tive border between the “short-run” and the “long-run”. 
It was proved that in contrary to hyperbolic discounting 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting can be applied in analyses 
including the technique of dynamic programming. Un-
der the infinite horizon using hyperbolic discounting is 
quite challenging.  
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting was first established 
by Phelps and Pollak (1968) regarding inter-genera-
tional preferences. Later it was adopted by Laibson 
(1997) to carry out survey covering the savings behavior 
of a consumer with self-control problems who has ac-
cess to imperfect commitment devices (e.g. illiquid as-
sets). The result of Laibson's research supposes consum-
ers to undersave as a result of the overconsumption  
during early stages. 
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting was implemented in 
terms of a procrastination (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999), retirement decisions (Diamond and Köszegi, 
2003), job search (Paserman, 2008), and addiction 
(Gruber and Koszegi, 2001).  
Formally the decision makers' utility has a follow-
ing definiton: 
1
( ) ( ).t it t i
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Determinants of the subjective discount rate. 
Subjective discount rate is an important innovation in 
terms of discounting model and a crucial measure of in-
dividuals' impatience. This variable is needed to be con-
sidered during the analysis of low savings with an ex-
planation why economic behavior varies depending on 
situations and different framings. 
Usually the subjective rate is evaluated through 
different hypothetical choices by asking the participants 
how much they would demand as a compensation or 
how much they agree to pay in order to delay or speed 
up gains or losses. Subjective discount rate is insepa- 
rable with a mental discounting process, which in turns 
is based on individual's cognitive ability. Discount rates 
vary among different groups and categories as no infor-
mation is to be perceived identically by different people. 
First of all, as it was discussed earlier people do not ne- 
cessary prefer to get the whole bunch of information 
they have been provided with due to the high costs 
arisen during elaboration of  information and collection 
of it. Even when this preliminary stage of data collection 
is over, the individual still has to process information 
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and come to some kind of conclusions and again he is 
constrained by his cognitive capacity. He might sup-
pose, that he has gathered the all necessary information, 
while there are still some methods left which he is not 
aware of. Also he might have framed the strategy which 
he considers as an optimal one due to the volume of data 
he perceived, while this strategy can be completely mis-
leading because of the ambiguous sources of infor-
mation or some irrelevant data. It has been proved, that 
better financial knowledge generates lower subjective 
rates. Getting higher education leads to deeper 
knowledge and enhancement of the ability to gather in-
formation and use it in a sufficient way. Anyway there 
still going to be a cognitive bias due to the extreme im-
portance of some factors in contract to the lack of use-
fulness of the same variables among different partici-
pants according to their personal priorities, experiments, 
habitats, needs and beliefs. Also gender and age have a 
certain impact on the formation of the subjective rate.  
Subjective discount rates can be also explained by 
the current economic environment and national welfare, 
which described by the rate of inflation and the index of 
well-being. The individual who operates in a relatively 
stable market and does not face some sharp exogenous 
shocks, tends to act more patiently than the person who 
has less access to the commitment devices such as cre- 
dits and performs in a difficult environment because 
when individuals face the absence of the commitment 
devices he is tempted to deviate from the initial plan 
(Janssens et al, 2017). The subjective rate can be exa- 
mined in a light of groups with similar strategies. The 
results obtained during this experiment can differ signi- 
ficantly among the groups due to the different extent to 
which the subjects include subjective rates in their deci-
sion-making. 
The better understanding of mental discounting 
process will allow to fulfill some gaps arisen consider-
ing standard economic models.  
Some words about the methodology of our em-
pirical research. During the exploratory analysis se- 
veral technics will be implemented, such as violin dia-
grams, regression model and decision tree, in order to 
compare the short-term discount rate and the long one 
between each other, so that the most reliable discount 
model will be revealed. One more thing to be examined 
is the effect of country differentiation on the formation 
of the subjective discount rate.  
Violin plot emerged not lot time ago, it was intro-
duced in the software package NCSS in 1997 and  
described by Hintze and Nelson (1998).  
Violin plot is a useful tool for visualizing the dis-
tribution of the data and its probability density. The ad-
vantage of this visual is that it provides with a more pro-
found information than box plot does. When the big 
sample of data is collected it cannot be stated without 
some valid proof that observations are subject to the nor-
mal distribution due to some outliers. Violin are able to 
fit big amount of data with different categories while the 
box plot is a limiting visual device. Usually bar plots are 
used in order to determine the mean value and the stan- 
dard error and illustrate some summary statistics, such 
as range and quartiles. Histograms can be applied to 
multimodal data but at the same can be a misleading 
method as well and requires much space for many dis-
tributions. Violin device is applied to show the shape of 
the distribution and it is very compact as it doesn’t com-
pose a big number of points. Wide parts of violin plot 
give information about the high probability that the cho-
sen variable will take the certain value, whereas the 
skinnier parts reflect the low probability. Overlaying the 
box plot on top of the violin pot will show the infor-
mation about median and interquartile range.  
The research is based on questionnaire which in-
cludes such questions that assume two different options. 
That is why, there is a need to introduce the concept of 
binary variable. Binary variable is a discrete variable 
that implies two different alternatives which are often 
labeled as 1 or 0. For example, binary variable can  
take values success/failure, male/female, presence of  
headache/absence etc. This concept is widely used in 
terms of classification. If the respondent belongs to the 
certain category, his answer is coded as 1, if no-it is 
coded as 0.  
We suppose that discount rate is normally distri- 
buted due to its extensive use in the field of economics 
and its convenience. It is characterized only by two  
variables: mean or it is also called expected value and 
standard deviation, which makes the research less com-
plicated. Mean is basically a computed average value. 
Standard deviation gives information about the spread 
of distribution. If data has a small standard deviation, the 
shape of the curve will be tighter and taller. In contrast, 
having larger standard deviation leads to getting a flatter 
and wider curve. The main assumptions are that the 
curve is symmetric at the center, which means that data 
is equally spread around the mean value, peak of the 
curve is represented by the mean of the data and the total 
square is equal to 1. However, on practice hardly can be 
this perfectly symmetric curve obtained. So if there is 
any suspicion that data is normally distributed, it is need 
to be checked by several statistical tests if this null hy-
pothesis about normality is true. Aim is to transform 
data that way that it reminds of the shape of the normal 
distribution. When we talk about normal distribution, 
we deal with the concept of the confident interval. The 
confident interval contains a proportion of data which 
lies between an upper and lower bound of a probability 
distribution. Usually 95% or 99% are used. The rest per-
centage includes the information about the tails of dis-
tribution. The confidence interval is a measure of uncer-
tainty. The higher confidence level entails the higher 
proportion of the data is located in the inner part of the 
curve and guarantee the higher level of certainty. The 
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normal distribution is a significant tool for calculating 
probabilities of many real events in different spheres.  
In order to illustrate different outcomes obtained 
during a range of choices the decision tree is generally 
used. This learning tool is very easy for understanding 
and predicting the best value of the targeted variable ac-
cording to costs, benefits and probabilities. A decision 
tree begins with a single node (also called root node), 
which is split into different subgroups, which in turn 
give a rise for more nodes and further outcomes and it 
can be expanded till the endpoint or till no more alterna-
tives are possible. In this survey the program R studio 
will be used for constructing the decision tree. This tool 
represents a possible alternative to a logistic regression 
and can be implemented in many different fields. Deci-
sion tree presents an important advantage in contrast to 
a logistic regression as it handles nonlinearity and also 
provides with valid results even if the survey deviates 
from assumptions. Also it is easy to be performed due to 
its simplicity and no need for a careful data processing 
as it works with heterogeneous and missing data.  
During the formation of the decision tree re-
searcher is able to identify which kind of outcome each 
alternative will bring depending on different conditions, 
compare them in the future and determine which one is 
considered as an optimal one. Once again-no need for 
data to follow any precise distribution, which is ex-
plained non-parametric framework for a decision tree 
method. The missing values are taken as in isolated ca- 
tegory or the can be combined into some other existing 
categories. This method is crucial in terms of decision-
making as it contains all significant factors for the par-
ticular choice. However, if one single variable close to 
the root node is being modified, it can change the struc-
ture of the decision tree dramatically and result in a lack 
of credibility and loss of its simplicity.  
Elements of the model. The main goal in this 
cross-country analysis is to identify, whether risk-aver-
sion and differentiation between countries influence the 
subjective discount function or not. Are there some 
country peculiarities which have a certain impact on a 
discount rate and is there a difference between the 
weight which assign risk-averse person to the current 
and future consumption comparing to risk-seeking indi-
vidual or the environment in which person operates does 
not present a great importance. 
Also the model will provide a proof that a discount 
rate tends to diminish as the time period becomes 
greater, so that hyperbolic discounting model is way 
more relevant to be applied on practice comparing to an 
exponential. In order to make the difference between a 
discount rate for a short-term period and the rate for a 
long one be evaluated the participants experienced the 
alternatives at different points in times. The model is 
based on a questionnaire spread within people from dif-
ferent countries and different ages. The questionnaire 
consists of 5 questions, which reveal the preferences and 
discount rates by modelling hypothetical situations in 
which participants are asked about the amount of com- 
pensation that could make them indifferent to an extra 
period of waiting or in which they are proposed to 
choose between different alternatives. Components of 
questionnaire: 
1. Age 
In some surveys it was proved that age is one of the 
factors influencing the subjective rate as elder people 
have more responsibilities and family to care about, so 
they are more vulnerable than youngers to the present 
consumption in contrast to future. However, elder  
people should also take into consideration such distant 
plans as a retirement plan, savings for children' future, 
which make them sometimes restrict their current con-
sumption and save for later in order to stick with a plan 
about their consumption after retirement when they in-
evitably face a lower income. The question about age 
seems to be quite ambiguous as the youngers are less 
patient due to their psychological features of character 
building and lack of plans for future, but at the same 
time adults suffer more from negative economic shocks 
because of the broader range of responsibilities and  
inability to adapt to changes as fast as youngers do.  
In this survey 103 participants took part. The ma-
jority of respondents lie in the age group between ages 
of 21 and 26 and represent students or graduates. People 
older than 26 refer to specialists. There are some outli- 
ners represented by subjects in age of 17 and 53. Hence, 
the main focus will be on students.  
 
 
 
2. Country 
This variable implies different economic environ-
ments, political systems and cultural routes, which can 
cause significant variations of time discounting. Nor-
mally the effect of culture was not included in standard 
economic models and did not represent an interest for 
economists. However, the growing amount of literature 
has demonstrated that preferences can be endogenous 
and can be formed with various societal and cultural 
norms and standards (Bowles, 1998; Eugster et al, 2011; 
Fehr and Hoff, 2011). Culture has an impact on all 
spheres of individual's life such as a cognitive ability, 
personality, economic knowledge and time perception. 
Also different countries possess different levels of 
wealth and education. The majority of researchers have 
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established that wealthier people show the higher degree 
of patience (Lawrance, 1991; Harrison, et al, 2002; 
Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009). Poor household demon-
strate relatively short time horizons and more interested 
in investments which can bring an immediate gratifica-
tion as they have limited budgets. 
Mei Wang, Marc Oliver Rieger, and Thorsten Hens 
have introduced a significant survey including 53 coun-
tries studying the impact of cultural dimension on time 
preferences. They examined the waiting tendency across 
different countries to compute the interest rate and com-
pare it to the annual market rate. They claim that diffe- 
rences in consumption might be explained by the diffe- 
rences in market rates, inflation rates, access for a credit 
market and the wealth level of country described by log 
(GDP/capita) (Wang et al, 2016). The different tenden-
cies in cultures such as individualism and collectivism 
have also been studied. I consider this analysis as one of 
the crucial in terms of time preferences and empirical 
evidence of the hyperbolic discounting. That is why, I 
feel relevant to include the country variable to the re-
gression model and estimate the magnitude of it on a 
subjective discount rate. 
There were distinguished several groups by geo- 
graphy: Russia, America (including Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina), Europe and East. The motherland of the ma-
jority of respondents is Russia, their share in all sample 
reached 78 per cent. The second largest share of 10 per 
cent belongs to European citizens. The remaining per-
cent constitutes respondents from other countries. 
 
3. Short-term discount rate 
The first question is aimed at revealing the short-
term discount rate for individual who is asked to choose 
between getting 100 dollars immediately and waiting 
one more year to receive a higher reward equal to 150 
dollars. The computed rate will be consequently com-
pared to the discount rate obtained from the question 
about longer time perspective. This task identifies to 
which extent is the respondent impatient. According to 
the pie chart, 73 per cent are willing to get cash right 
now and only 23 per cent agree to wait. It means, that 
the overwhelming majority of respondents tend to care 
more about current well-being and their discount rate 
exceeds the break-off rate in this case equal to 50 per 
cent under which the individual is assumed to be indif-
ferent between 100 dollars now and 150 dollars later. 
 
 
4. Commitment device  
The next term is connected with an external force 
which can prevent individual from procrastination. It is 
likely, that individual strongly believes the project to be 
completed in the nearest future, but at the same time 
keeps delaying a working process when the planned date 
of completion arrives. As soon as the individual realizes 
that it is hard for him to stick with his original plan, he 
has an opportunity to impose himself with some kind of 
commitment devices which can motivate him to perform 
the task more effectively. 
The participants were asked about the moment 
when they are willing to start doing the project which 
takes one day to be accomplished before the deadline 
equals to one month will be over. The preferable amount 
of days until the deadline is determined by the respon- 
dents themselves depending on their self-awareness of 
their dynamic inconsistent preferences. The obtained re-
sults are depicted on a histogram below. 
 
 
According to the outcomes, respondents, on aver-
age, are more likely to start the project in the second half 
of the month from 7 till 10 days before the end of the 
deadline. However, there is a significant portion of  
people, who are ready to start more in advance-in a first 
half of the given time frame. The category called 
“More” is mainly composed of respondents who are 
committed to start at the time that they receive an as-
signment. This decision was coded as 30 days which 
means that they do not hesitate to proceed precisely on 
a date of launching a project. 
It should be said that some respondents left the 
notes to their answers, explaining their desire to divide 
the project performance into several parts so they do not 
need to perform the whole project in a one day as it was 
initially set. Nevertheless, there is still a fair share of re- 
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spondents who tend to start the project close to the com-
pletion of the deadline, even in a day before they exceed 
it.   
 
5. Gamble 
The goal of this question is to identify whether the 
person is risk-averse. In order to do that respondents are 
offered two different alternatives: to get 1000 dollars for 
sure or take a risk and try to earn 2000 dollars with 50 
per cent probability of success.  During a process of de-
cision-making each economic agent inevitably deals 
with uncertainty such as a risk of inflation, risk of a 
lower income, risk of losing a job. Hence, being risk-
averse or loss-averse has a vital impact on individual’s 
preferences. For example, if individual expects his in-
come to decrease he will rather reduce his consumption 
in the future period than in a current one as he mentally 
takes savings as losses accompanied by the reduction in 
his present well-being. The risk evaluation can make a 
substantial contribution to the discount utility model. 
The diagram shows that the vast majority of re-
spondents voted for the guaranteed option of getting 
1000 dollars, which means that people in our sample are 
risk averse.  
 
The next question in terms of risk aversion is about 
options for investment. There are two possibilities: in-
vest in secure, risk-free bonds with assured return equal 
to 5 per cent, which is smaller than return of 7 per cent 
obtained by investing in stocks. However, stocks repre-
sent a threat due to different risks, volatility and a 
chance to lose all money in case of bankruptcy.  
 
From the pie chart it is clear that the majority of 
respondents prefer a secure investment to risky stocks. 
Only 19% per cent is willing to take a risk and invest in 
stock associated with a risk of total money loss with 
50% probability.  
 
6. Long-term discount rate 
It comes to the formation of long-term discount 
rate which will be compared to the short-term in order 
to measure the credibility of hyperbolic discount model. 
There is a question about purchasing of property and 
two possible how you can do this. Either you are saving 
for 3 years in order to by apartment on your own money 
or you are taking a loan for 5 years and immediately 
moving in. The cost of the flat is 1000000 euros and the 
payment for a loan is 1500000 euros. The first oppor-
tunity demands patience and willing to cut off the cur-
rent consumption. The second one implies an immediate 
gratification and higher costs in the end.  
 
The respondents appeared to be more patient du- 
ring this question as 70 per cent of the total sample are 
ready to save money and buy the flat in three years. This 
interim outcome shows that when it comes to more dis-
tant future people tend to act relatively more patient than 
in the closest time periods. It will be explored further by 
means of violin diagrams, regression model and deci-
sion tree. 
The discount model. Hyperbolic discounting as-
sumes that long-term discount rate differs substantially 
from a short-term discount rate due to the higher con-
cern about the current well-being and diminishing value. 
As the hyperbolic discount model is considered as a 
most reliable on practice, it was implemented in this pa-
per. In order to evaluate the credibility of the hyperbolic 
model two question about discount rate and different 
time horizons are included. Two variables are fully ex-
amined in the analysis: do respondents prefer 100 now 
or 150 in one year and do they rather take a loan for 
buying a flat or take their time and start saving their own 
money for three years. The rest of the factors played the 
role of the explanatory variables.  
The model emphasizes on the influence of country 
and risk aversion factors on the subjective discount rate. 
Through the regression model we obtain the estimated 
values of discount rates including all variables described 
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above. The coefficients of all explanatory variables are 
computed and according to p-values such parameters as 
European group and risk aversion are considered to be 
significant. Belonging to American group is taken as a 
basic feature, so coefficients of the variables illustrating 
other country groups show the difference of the changes 
of the short-term discount rate with the switch from 
America to any other country. The coefficient of Euro-
pean group variable is extremely high, which indicates 
the decrease in the discount rate and the likelihood of 
choosing 150 dollars in the future instead of 100 dollars 
now. This result shows that European people are more 
patient in contrast to American ones. Same explanation 
is applied with the variable risk aversion based on the 
choice between bonds and stocks. Bonds are taken as a 
basic feature and high coefficient of the model means 
that the switch to riskier investment is connected with a 
drop in the discount rate. Hence, risk seeking people 
demonstrate higher degree of patience. 
Then, in order to estimate the long-term discount 
rate and compare it with a short-term rate the willing-
ness to take the loan is taken as an explained variable 
and same factors are included as explanatory variables. 
According to the results, even with a big confident in-
terval, there is no significant connection between dis-
count rate and included indicators. The previous ques-
tion is based on precise alternatives: 100 dollars now or 
150 in one year, which can reveal the subjective dis- 
count rate directly, whereas the question about long-
term discount rate seems to be ambiguous in a light of 
the discount rate as it includes not only this parameter, 
but also the desire and opportunity to take the loan. This 
question implies some other factors which have impact 
on respondents’ answers. 
The violin plots are used to visualize the distribu-
tions of both discount rates. The average values for five 
years and one year are 8 per cent and 60 per cent. We 
assume that computed average values of discount rates 
represent the mean values and stimulate the distribution 
of these values using violin plots. It should be taken into 
account apart from the calculated values of discount 
rates that we suppose one per cent or very few people to 
have zero discount rate, which means that they are com-
pletely indifferent to the value of money. This assump-
tion is made according to the necessity of two parame-
ters in terms of the normal distribution-mean and stan- 
dard deviation. The average value itself doesn’t give any 
statistically significant information. Hence, the normal 
distribution cannot be plotted only with a help of one 
point and requires additional value. The shape of plots 
corresponds to the normal distribution. It becomes evi-
dent from the violin plot that discount rate is unstable 
through time and discount time for the nearest future is 
extremely higher than for more distant time period. One 
of the possible explanations could be the use of hyper-
bolic discounting which rejects the hypothesis about a 
single discount rate for any time period. 
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We will start in a root node with a question about a 
country factor. In every stage depending on factors  
respondents are divided into two categories and the 
amount of people, who are willing to make a decision 
between two outcomes: 100 dollars right now or 150 one 
year later, is calculated The left branch of the tree dis-
plays the positive answer for each choice and the right 
one-the negative reply. First we allocate respondents ac-
cording to the question, whether they belong to Ame- 
rica, East, Russia or not. According to the division of the 
sample, 90 per cent of the respondents originate these 
countries. The rest of the participants come from  
Europe. In each node there are three numbers: the per-
centage shows the proportion of respondents who reply 
positive or negative on each factor variable, decimal 
fraction illustrates how many people vote for 150 dollars 
later and the number above means the reward which was 
preferred by the majority of the respondents in a precise 
node and stage. The next stage lies in the question about 
the possibility to invest in secure bonds. The vast majo- 
rity are likely to choose stocks and among this sample 
only 14 per cent have chosen 150 dollars later. Among 
people who prefer risky investments the decision of 
choosing 150 dollars in one year turned out to be pre-
dominant. As a result, the decision tree shows that the 
amount of patient respondents prevails over the impa-
tient subgroup.  
Conclusion. The approach of this paper was to 
identify, whether there is a certain impact of cultural pe-
culiarities and risk aversion on time preferences and the 
formation of the subjective rate through the cross-cul-
tural survey. Also during the practical part, the null hy-
pothesis about the diminishing value of the rate was ex-
plained by hyperbolic discounting. The effect of uncer-
tainty was carefully examined. The question about an 
access to the lending and borrowing tool was also in-
cluded in the survey due to its possible impact on time 
preferences.  
However, it is hard to explain all kind of anomalies 
only in terms of the hyperbolic model. Firstly, we as-
sume that the respondents evaluate the nearest payoff 
and more distant one with the same analytical power. In 
contrary, some papers highlight that people due to some 
cultural perceptions do not evaluate the future reward as 
a real one, which leads to overweighting the current re-
ward. There is an example of Latino people, who view 
time as a circular concept so they tend to orient more on 
the current well-being (Wang et al, 2016).  
It was proved that a significant proportion of re-
spondents demonstrate the impatience when two differ-
ent time perspectives are compared between each other. 
The questionnaire consists of single payoffs which re-
sults in the decreasing discount rate, which is consistent 
with the hyperbolic discounting. However, Loewenstein 
and Prelec (1993) draw attention to the fact, that if  
people face the sequences of outcomes, they, in contrast 
to isolated outcomes, prefer an improvement of their 
utility through time. The explanation might be the adap-
tion for different levels of utility and viewing positive or 
negative shifts as deviations from the standard of the 
consumption which is obtained at each level, which al-
low people to recognize positive changes as the most 
valuable (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993). Therefore, 
impatience is frequently met in a light of single out-
comes, whereas the sequence of outcomes entails the de-
sire for improvement of the utility. There is one more 
difficulty which arises during the holding of an experi-
ment. People while responding do not receive real pay-
offs so their answers cannot be considered as fully cre- 
dible due to the lack of powerful incentives. Further- 
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more, we focus mainly on students as a subsample, but 
data presents some outliners expressed by some consi- 
derably older respondents than the majority of respon- 
dents. 
Nevertheless, the effect of psychological and social 
factors: cognitive ability, cultural aspects, visceral influ-
ences, temptations on intertemporal analysis is evident. 
The main goal to illustrate different levels of discount 
rates among the countries according to the various de-
gree of patience was achieved. There are some possible 
extensions to this paper, which will lead to more valid 
results and more complex model. In the future the model 
can be supplemented by including in questionnaire the 
part about losses so the difference in discounting gain 
and losses and preferable time gap can be jointly exa- 
mined. Also the respondents can be separated according 
to the certain domains of their behavior. This idea re-
quires complicated observations of the respondents’ in-
comes and educational background in the dynamics so 
the analysis is carried out on practice. We can assume 
that people who graduate from the economic universi-
ties are more informed about the money value, inflation 
and discount function than people, who operate in other 
fields. That is why, it is crucial to divide all obtained 
data in some homogeneous groups. Anyway, this survey 
is an important step at establishment the correlation  
between the subjective discount rate and culture. De-
spite this observed link, the role of risk aversion with 
regard to the discount function, is also empirically con-
firmed. All the factors mentioned in this survey provide 
a valuable framework for further study of utility model 
and time preferences.  
 
References 
1. Ariely, D. and Wertenbroch, K. (2002). Pro-
crastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by 
Precommitment. Psychological Science. Vol. 13 (3),  
рр. 219 – 224. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280. 
00441 
2. Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous Preferences: The 
Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic 
Institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36 (1), 
рр. 75 – 111.  
3. Carvalho, F. J. C. (1992). Mr. Keynes and Post 
Keynesians. Principles of Macroeconomics for a Monetary 
Production Economy. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.  
4. Davidson, P. (1972). Money and the Real World. 
London, Macmillan.  
5. Diamond, P. and Köszegi, B. (2003). Quasi-
hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement. Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 87 (9–10), рр. 1839 – 1872. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00041-5 
6. Eugster, B. Lalive, R. Steinhauer, A. and 
Zweimüller, J. (2011). The Demand for Social Insurance: 
Does Culture Matter? Economic Journal, Vol. 121 (556), 
рр. F413 – F448. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2011.02479.x 
7. Ferr, E. and Hoff, K. (2011). Introduction: Tastes, 
Castes and Culture: The Influence of Society on Preferen- 
ces. Economic Journal, Vol. 121 (556), рр. F396 – F412. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02478.x 
8. Fisher, I. (1930). The Theory of Interest as 
Determined by Impatience to Spend Income and 
Opportunity to Invest it. New York, Macmillan.  
9. Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. and O’Donoghue, 
T. (2002). Time Discounting and Time Preference: A 
Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 40 
(2), рр. 351 – 401. 
10. Goldman, S. M. (1979). Intertemporally Incon-
sistent Preferences and The Rate of Consumption. Econo-
metrica, Vol. 47, рр. 621 – 626. doi: 10.2307/1910409 
11. Gruber, J. and Köszegi, B. (2001).  Is Addiction 
“Rational”? Theory and Evidence. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 116 (4), рр. 1261 – 1303.  
12. Halevy, Y. (2015) Time Consistency: Stationarity 
and Time Invariance. Econometrica, Vol. 83 (1), рр. 335 – 
352. doi: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10872 
13. Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., and Williams, M. B. 
(2008). Estimating Individual Discount Rates in Denmark: 
A Field Experiment. American Economic Review, Vol. 92 
(5), рр. 1606 – 1617. doi: 10.1257/000282802762024674 
14. Hintze, J. L. and Nelson, R. D. (1998). Violin 
Plots: A Box Plot-Density Trace Synergism. The American 
Statistician, Vol. 52 (2), рр. 181 – 184. 
15. Janssens, W., Kramer, B. and Swart, L. (2017). Be 
Patient When Measuring Hyperbolic Discounting: Statio-
nary, Time Consistency and Time Invariance in a Field 
Experiment. Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 126, 
рр. 77 – 90. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016. 
12.011 
16. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Economet-
rica, Vol. 47 (2), рр. 263 – 291. doi: DOI: 10.2307/ 
1914185 
17. Köszegi, B. and Rabin, M. (2006). A Model of 
Reference-Dependent Preferences. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 121 (4), рр. 1133 – 1165. 
18. Köszegi, B. and Rabin, M. (2007). Reference-
Dependent Rick Attitudes. American Economic Review, 
Vo. 97 (4), рр. 1047 – 1073. 
19. Krupka, E. L. and Stephens, M. (2013). The 
Stability of Measured Time Preference. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 85, рр. 11 – 
19. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.010 
20. Laibson, D. (1996). Hyperbolic Discount 
Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy. NBER 
Working Paper 5635. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau 
of Economic Research.  
21. Laibson, D. (1997). Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic 
Discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112 
(2), рр. 443 – 477. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/ 
003355397555253 
22. Lawrance, E. C. (1991). Poverty and the Rate of 
Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 99 (1), рр. 54 – 77.  
23. Loewenstein, G. F. and Prelec, D. (1993). 
Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes. Psychological 
Review, Vol. 100 (1), рр. 91 – 108. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.100.1.91 
24. O'Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (1999). Doing It 
Now or Later. American Economic Review, Vol. 116 (1), 
рр. 103 – 124. doi: 10.1257/aer.89.1.103 
M. Vladimirova, I. Rozmainsky 
19 
Економічний вісник Донбасу № 4(58), 2019 
25. O'Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (2001). Choice 
and Procrastination. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
116 (1), рр. 121 – 160. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/ 
003355301556365 
26. O'Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (2002). 
Procrastination on Long-Term Projects. Working Paper 
Series qt5zb60651. UC Berkeley: Department of 
Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research. 
27. O'Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (2003). Self-
Awareness and Self Control. In: G. Loewenstein, D. Read, 
and R. Baurmeister (Eds.), Time and Decision: Economic 
and Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice, 
рр. 217 – 243. Russell Sage Foundation.  
28. Paserman, M. D. (2008). Job Search and 
Hyperbolic Discounting: Structual Estimation and Policy 
Evaluation. Economic Journal, Vol. 118 (531), рр. 1418 – 
1452. 
29. Phelps, E. S. and Pollak, R. A. (1968). On Second-
Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth. 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 35 (2), рр. 185 – 199. 
30. Samuelson, P. (1937). A Note on Measurement of 
Utility. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 4 (2), рр. 155– 
161. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2967612 
31. Strotz, R. H. (1955). Myopia and Inconsistency in 
Dynamic Utility Maximization. Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 23 (3), рр. 165 – 180. doi: https://doi.org/ 
10.2307/2295722 
32. Wang, M., Rieger, M. O., and Hens, T. (2016). 
How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 53 
Countries. Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 52, рр. 
115 – 135. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.12.001 
33. Yesuf, M. and Bluffstone, R. (2009). Poverty, 
Risk-Aversion, and Path Dependence in Low-Income 
Countries: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 91 (4), 
рр. 1022 – 1037. doi:  10.1111/j.1467-8276.2009.01307.x 
 
Владімірова М. Ю., Розмаїнський І. В. Гіпер-
болічне дисконтування і його наслідки: емпіричний 
аналіз на основі опитувань 
У ході цього крос-культурного дослідження 
тимчасових переваг перевіряється достовірність мо-
делі гіперболічного дисконтування. У даній статті 
порівнюються моделі експоненціального дисконту-
вання і гіперболічна модель і пропонуються різні мо-
дифікації існуючих концепцій. Згадуються різні види 
аномалій, які викликають необхідність розширення 
моделі гіперболічного дисконтування. Ця стаття спря-
мована на вивчення моделі дисконтування, процесу 
прийняття рішень і формування суб'єктивної ставки 
дисконтування індивідів з точки зору поведінкової 
економіки, шляхом включення в модель таких психо-
логічних чинників, як культурне й економічне середо-
вище, а також несхильність до ризику. Ці доповнення 
призводять до більш складної і такої моделі дисконту-
вання, що заслуговує довіри. Прокрастинація розгля-
дається як пряма реалізація гіперболічного дисконту-
вання. Крім того, виділено потенційні недоліки, що ви-
никли в ході експериментальної частини, і запропоно- 
 
 
 
вано можливі рішення. Емпіричний аналіз заснований 
на опитуваннях. 
Ключові слова: ставка дисконтування, тимчасові 
переваги, гіперболічне дисконтування, прокрастина-
ція, несхильність до ризику. 
 
Vladimirova М., Rozmainsky I. Hyperbolic 
Discounting and Its Consequences: Empirical Analysis 
on the Base of Surveys  
During this cross-cultural research regarding time 
preferences the credibility of hyperbolic discounting model 
is examined. This paper is based on the comparison 
between the exponential discounting model and hyperbolic 
model and proposal of different modifications to the 
existing concepts. Different kind of anomalies, which bring 
up the necessity of the extension of the hyperbolic 
discounting model, are mentioned. This paper is aimed at 
exploring the discount model, the process of decision-
making and the formation of the individuals’ subjective 
discount rate from the standpoint of behavioral economics 
by including in the model such psychological factors as 
cultural and economic environment and risk aversion. 
These supplements lead to more complex and credible 
discount model. The term of procrastination is considered 
as a direct implementation of hyperbolic discounting. 
Furthermore, the potential drawbacks occurred during the 
experimental part are highlighted and possible solutions 
are proposed. Empirical analysis is based on the surveys. 
Keywords: discount rate, time preferences, hyper-
bolic discounting, procrastination, risk aversion. 
 
Владимирова М. Ю., Розмаинский И. В. Гипер-
болическое дисконтирование и его последствия: эм-
пирический анализ на основе опросов 
В ходе этого кросс-культурного исследования 
временных предпочтений проверяется достоверность 
модели гиперболического дисконтирования. В данной 
статье сравниваются модели экспоненциального дис-
контирования и гиперболическая модель и предлага-
ются различные модификации существующих концеп-
ций. Упоминаются различные виды аномалий, кото-
рые вызывают необходимость расширения модели ги-
перболического дисконтирования. Эта статья направ-
лена на изучение модели дисконтирования, процесса 
принятия решений и формирования субъективной 
ставки дисконтирования индивидов с точки зрения по-
веденческой экономики, путем включения в модель та-
ких психологических факторов, как культурная и эко-
номическая среда, а также нерасположенность к риску. 
Эти дополнения приводят к более сложной и заслужи-
вающей доверия модели дисконтирования. Прокрасти-
нация рассматривается как прямая реализация гипер-
болического дисконтирования. Кроме того, выделены 
потенциальные недостатки, возникшие в ходе экспери-
ментальной части, и предложены возможные решения. 
Эмпирический анализ основан на опросах. 
Ключевые слова: ставка дисконтирования, вре-
менные предпочтения, гиперболическое дисконтиро-
вание, прокрастинация, нерасположенность к риску. 
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